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ABSTRACT 
Purpose – Commercial real estate is a highly specific asset: heterogeneous, indivisible and 
with less information transparency than most other commonly held investment assets. These 
attributes encourage the use of intermediaries during asset acquisition and disposal. However, 
there are few attempts to explain the use of different brokerage models (with differing costs) 
in different markets. This study aims to address this gap. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study analyses 9,338 real estate transactions in London 
and New York City from 2001 to 2011. Data are provided by Real Capital Analytics and 
cover over $450 billion of investments in this period. Brokerage trends in the two cities are 
compared and probit regressions are used to test whether the decision to transact with broker 
representation varies with investor or asset characteristics. 
 
Findings – Results indicate greater use of brokerage in London, especially by purchasers. 
This persists when data are disaggregated by sector, time or investor type, pointing to the role 
of local market culture and institutions in shaping brokerage models and transaction costs. 
Within each city, the nature of the investors involved seems to be a more significant influence 
on broker use than the characteristics of the assets being traded. 
 
Originality/value – Brokerage costs are the single largest non-tax charge to an investor when 
trading commercial real estate, yet there is little research in this area. This study examines the 
role of brokers and provides empirical evidence on factors that influence the use and mode of 
brokerage in two major investment destinations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial real estate can be an attractive investment option, with the best assets providing 
a stable, long-term income return coupled with the possibility of increases in capital value. In 
a portfolio context, returns from real estate provide diversification benefits, under certain 
conditions, when compared with returns from equities and bonds.
1
 Furthermore, the private 
real estate market offers opportunities to actively manage assets and so influence their 
income generating potential. However, investors encounter high transaction costs in private 
real estate markets because of the dispersed and private nature of these markets and the 
heterogeneous nature of the assets, which exhibit widely varying physical and locational 
characteristics. These factors increase search and information costs as well as the complexity 
of a transaction once a suitable investment has been identified. 
 
The attributes of real estate assets ensure that the transaction process is costly and time 
consuming, with the risks and costs being of a character and order that is different from other 
mainstream investment assets. For instance, within this process, price agreement – the 
moment a bid meets or exceeds a seller’s minimum reservation price – is only the beginning 
of further negotiations and processes that are neither immediate nor without friction. Lin and 
Vandell (2007) explore risks related to liquidity, such as the uncertainty of marketing/selling 
periods and the difficulty of liquidating assets rapidly in response to shocks. Meanwhile, 
Bond et al. (2007) note risk mitigation strategies that investors may adopt in response, such 
as longer holding periods and a minimum number of assets to be held in a portfolio. 
 
                                                 
1
 For recent evidence, see MacKinnon and Al Zaman (2009) or Rehring (2012). 
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The high costs and extended time taken to transact real estate, with a high degree of 
information asymmetry between seller and buyer, culminate to negatively affect the liquidity 
of the asset. This is important as the less liquid an asset, the higher the inherent risk of 
holding it (Grossman and Miller, 1988; Bond et al. 2007). Market and asset information 
necessary to overcome inherent asymmetries and reduce transaction risk often comes through 
intermediaries (brokers/agents) who work between and on behalf of investment firms. 
However, intermediaries can represent a substantial transaction cost. Considered as a 
percentage of the price of the asset, the cost of the broker or agent is often the greatest non-
tax charge to the investor, at around 1% of the price of the asset (McAllister et al., 2008). 
 
Research by McAllister et al. (2008) and Sawyer et al. (2003) highlights the importance of 
brokers and the process of brokerage to understanding these issues. However, while research 
has identified liquidity variation as a key by-product of the transaction process, it offers little 
direct analysis of the role of brokers in commercial real estate markets or the transaction costs 
specifically associated with brokerage and how these might be usefully defined as explicit 
liquidity costs. There are no extant studies that consider the costs of liquidity as directly 
related to local institutions and the attendant cost of brokerage; nor are there academic studies 
to our knowledge that consider how these costs vary across commercial real estate markets. 
This paper marks the first time that explicit costs of transacting (acquiring) commercial real 
estate have been equated to liquidity costs influenced by different institutional environments 
in which exchange occurs. We consider the costs of liquidity to be a function of broker 
representation since successful investment into commercial real estate requires timely asset 
and market knowledge that is often provided by brokers/agents working outside the 
investment firm. These are specific, measurable costs of liquidity that are influenced by 
institutions and which vary according to differences in observable brokerage use and 
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structure. The cost to the investor of securing necessary knowledge through brokers prior to 
and during the acquisition or disposal of real estate is a key transaction cost.  
 
This paper examines how both broker use (whether a transaction involves a broker or not) 
and broker structure (whether one or both parties are represented or not) varies both across 
and within different commercial real estate markets. Such variations may be expected where 
there are differences in the complexity of assets or the nature of the parties to the transaction. 
In the latter case, if some participants are more active than others in a particular real estate 
market, then these actors may have less need of the search and information functions that 
brokers provide. On the other hand, for sellers, the marketing function of brokers may remain 
important. While these arguments seem logical, it is not known to what extent they 
correspond with the actual use of brokerage by different market participants. It is this 
question that this paper sets out to answer. 
 
The study uses transaction data from London and New York City, which were selected owing 
to their importance as destinations for international real estate investment and so that cross-
border comparisons could be made.
2
 Marked differences are found between these two cities 
in terms of the prevalence of brokerage, with London exhibiting much greater levels of buyer 
representation and of double (or differentiated) brokerage. This does not simply reflect 
differences between these locations in the mix of assets and investors, though asset and 
investor characteristics play some role in explaining which deals within a market are likely to 
be brokered. Instead, differences persist across property types, time and investor groups, 
suggesting that local institutions and investment culture strongly influence the approach to 
                                                 
2
 Newell et al. (2010) document how New York and London were the top two cities globally in terms 
of commercial real estate capital flows prior to and just after the onset of the global financial crisis. 
These cities are also the primary financial centres within their respective time zones. 
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brokerage that is adopted in different locations. This, in turn, influences transaction costs in 
those places. 
 
The next section discusses prior research on brokerage that is related to this investigation. 
After this, the dataset used to examine brokerage patterns is presented and explored through 
tabular analyses. Results from probit models that more formally test which factors explain the 
form of brokerage observed for individual deals are then discussed. A final section concludes 
by examining the findings of the study in the light of ideas from institutional economics. 
 
 
BROKERAGE 
 
The nature of commercial real estate assets affects the structure of the market through which 
they are exchanged and informs investment processes both within the investment firm and 
across the wider market. Asset attributes affect transaction time whilst the transaction period, 
though variable, incurs costs that are observable and relate to the role of brokers/agents in the 
exchange process (Malone and Smith, 1988). Market structures and processes are driven by 
human action (Mises, 1949; Hayek, 1945) and incur unique costs. Networks of 
brokers/agents frequently facilitate the exchange of commercial real estate assets and this 
introduces costs unique to real estate investment (Williamson, 1991; Burt and Knez, 1995). 
 
The role of the broker can be further defined as facilitating liquidity, at a cost. The cost 
incurred in performing this function relates to facilitating communication between seller and 
buyer, introducing asset specific knowledge to the investor necessary to initiate a transaction, 
and addressing other risks during the exchange, all defined here as the costs of liquidity. For 
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investors, the decision to acquire strategically important investment knowledge through 
brokers is a product of firm level calculations (Williamson, 1979; Klein, 1996; Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). These calculations drive internal decision making concerning the investment 
process and determine the market and firm boundaries that then define and determine specific 
brokerage structures (Zenger et al., 2011). The cost of the broker is the price of knowledge 
pivotal to the successful acquisition of real estate assets. Firm level capital calculations and 
attendant costs are dynamic and will vary across markets. As the costs of brokerage vary, so 
too will the costs of liquidity. 
 
Research concerning intermediation and broker effects is heavily geared toward residential 
real estate and no extant studies define the role of the broker as that of providing liquidity, 
nor the price of the broker and the cost of the transaction as an explicit liquidity cost. There is 
comparatively little research available regarding intermediation and brokerage in commercial 
real estate markets. Hence, the following brief review of literature on residential brokerage is 
designed to provide context for discussion of the much more limited number of studies that 
address brokerage in commercial real estate. A more comprehensive survey of the residential 
literature can be found in Zietz and Sirmans (2011). 
 
Yinger (1981) creates a model of matching behaviour in which brokers seek to affect 
individual asset (house) prices, but not the distribution of prices across the market. Salant 
(1991) then examines broker effects on residential asking prices and models optimal sale 
prices based on the inclusion of a broker at different phases of the sale. The author notes the 
potential affect of broker commissions in dissuading sellers from engaging the services of a 
broker when initially listing their property. Meanwhile, Jud (1983) concludes from a limited 
study of urban areas in North Carolina that brokers (generally) do not affect the price of 
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houses they sell. However, Jud and Frew (1986) conclude that brokers do affect house prices, 
obtaining higher prices in comparison to sellers marketing their homes without the aid of 
broker representation. This, the authors conclude, is analogous to an advertising effect in 
markets with imperfect information. 
 
Rutherford et al. (2005) provide perhaps the most quoted study (cf. Freakonomics) into 
brokerage effects on transaction cost and price. They found that agent owned properties sell 
at a premium (4.5%-7.0%) above non-agent owned properties as agents kept their own 
properties listed for longer in order to seek higher prices; an example of misaligned 
incentives as the marginal return for the additional time to seek a higher price is less 
significant when the agent is selling for another. Information asymmetry and misaligned 
incentives in broker contracts has also been explored by Anglin and Arnott (1991). They 
found that the typical fixed commission contract between agents and principals failed to fully 
address inherent information asymmetries, or to allocate risk and efficiently align incentives 
of the agents involved (see also Yavas and Colwell, 1999). Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997) 
examine the problems associated with information asymmetry around the use of sub-agents 
(broker working with seller broker, or listing agent) and dual agency (two brokers, both 
belonging to the same firm). They observe that when home buyers believe that a sub-agent is 
working on their behalf (instead of with and on behalf of the seller’s agent), the result is 
higher selling prices at the expense of the buyer. Conversely, when sub-agent arrangements 
were disclosed, the result was lower sales prices, ceteris paribus. 
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Separate buyer brokerage became a common form of broker representation in the United 
States in response to disclosure laws enacted in 1993.
3
 It is distinct from either sub-agency or 
dual agency, as only this route offers a buyer specific representation that is independent from 
that of the seller. However, it is possible that different offices of the same brokerage firm can 
act with a degree of autonomy. For example, as commercial real estate markets have become 
more international, it is not unusual for buyers and sellers of investment grade real estate to 
be represented by different offices of the same brokerage firm, with the buyer broker based in 
the same country as the buyer. To our knowledge, the incentives for and behaviour of brokers 
in this context has yet to be researched.  
 
Zumpano et al. (1996) consider broker use among buyers of homes across the United States. 
They found that when buyers face high opportunity costs and lack local market knowledge, 
broker use is more likely. In addition, brokers were found to be associated with lower search 
times and reduced search costs, but did not have a significant effect on selling prices once 
selection bias was controlled for. Elder et al. (2000) in a subsequent study consulted data on 
10,000 home purchases, categorizing each transaction as brokered or not; buyer broker or not; 
and if brokered, how the buyer broker was compensated. They note that the buyer broker in 
the residential sales context is costless to the buyer as the buyer broker commission is shared 
from proceeds of the total sales commission. This is in contrast to the typical situation in 
commercial real estate  where brokers are paid directly by the party they represent. More 
recently, Wiley et al. (2012) examine how buyer characteristics vary with different forms of 
brokerage. Their work finds that certain buyers (low-income, non-native English speakers) 
are significantly less likely to complete an acquisition with broker representation. 
                                                 
3
 This legislation required the listing agent, or seller’s broker, to disclose the nature of any sub-agency 
or dual agency explicitly. 
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Discussion of the issues around brokerage (search, time on market, price effect and principal–
agent alignment) is far less developed in the commercial real estate field. A noteworthy 
exception is McAllister et al. (2008) that considers buyer broker effects on property selection 
by UK institutional investors. This work applies agency theory in unpacking the roles of the 
broker and the effect of information asymmetry within the commercial real estate investment 
process. The authors identify the system of agency in the UK as one in which buyers and 
sellers typically retain independent broker representation: a system of double, or 
differentiated, brokerage. They find that the principals involved in commercial real estate 
tend to be experienced, sophisticated investors who have a better understanding of the 
asymmetries and incentives that can affect agent behaviour, in contrast to typical owner-
occupiers operating in the residential market. The authors argue that this, together with the 
desire of agents to secure repeat business, serves to limit opportunistic behaviour by buyer 
brokers. 
 
There are scarcely any studies that explicitly consider the role of the broker in terms of 
transaction cost and price in commercial real estate investment because of the paucity of 
relevant available information. An exception to this is research by Graff and Webb (1997) 
that questions the relationship between asset price and brokerage cost and identifies 
misaligned incentives between principals and agents. They isolate and discuss subjective 
aspects in the appraisal of value for commercial real estate and reference the importance of 
private information in the commercial real estate market. They model exceptional agency 
costs as a product of information asymmetries and exceptional price discovery costs unique 
to commercial real estate investment. The work concludes that agency costs are a source of 
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economic inefficiency, with the poor performance of US offices a consequence of excessive 
agency costs.  
 
More recently, Hardin et al. (2009) analyse the effects of brokerage on transaction prices in 
the condominium markets of Phoenix and Atlanta. They conclude that, in these small 
commercial markets characterized by few investors and transparent assets, the broker had no 
significant effect on transaction price. The authors suggest that this is probably a consequence 
of the market sophistication of the investors involved in these commercial transactions, 
coupled with high levels of transparency concerning the income attributes of the properties in 
the study. 
 
The question that has not been addressed in the literature to date is what factors affect the use 
and structure of brokerage in commercial property transactions. The following section 
confirms that the commercial real estate investment process in London and New York City 
commonly includes some form of brokerage; however, the use of a buyer broker varies 
significantly between the two markets. This finding has further significance as buyer broker 
representation represents a direct cost of approximately 1% of the price of the real estate asset 
to the buyer. Put another way, the boundaries of commercial real estate investment firms 
active in London and New York City are not congruent; there is significant variation in the 
way real estate investors acquire the knowledge necessary to facilitate investment.  
 
The variations observed are evidence of institutional differences, differences in the rules of 
the game, in norms and codes of practice that coordinate interactions and govern relations 
between individuals (Davis and North, 1971). From the perspective of new institutional 
economics (Coase, 1960; 1964), and more specifically comparative institutional analysis (cf. 
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transaction cost economics) (Williamson, 2008), the system and structures observed in these 
market transactions should provide the optimum governance trade-off for both buyer and 
seller
4
, ceteris paribus. When a buyer is represented separately from the seller, transaction 
and liquidity costs increase. Nonetheless, transaction cost economics maintains that the 
system of exchange employed (no broker, one broker or two brokers) should be the one that 
the parties perceive best balances costs and risk. Given the relative strength of the investment 
players in this market – among both institutions and brokers – the possibility of persistent 
oligopoly seems unlikely. Rather, it seems more likely that the system of intermediation 
employed provides a service (e.g., greater anonymity and market reach) that investors 
consider to be more valuable than the cost of brokerage. Liquidity comes at a cost reflected in 
the price of brokerage.  
 
 
DATASET AND RESULTS 
 
To explore these ideas further, data on real estate transactions in London and New York City 
are examined. These locations were selected for study owing to their size, depth and 
importance as real estate markets in their respective countries and the international 
investment arena. Furthermore, anecdotally, they exhibit different forms of and approaches to 
brokerage, something that this analysis confirms. Transaction data was supplied by Real 
Capital Analytics (RCA), a research organization that collects and analyses data on real estate 
investment transactions in all major real estate markets across the globe. RCA focus on 
transactions of $2.5 million or greater in the US and $10 million or greater elsewhere; in the 
                                                 
4
 Coase (1964) and Williamson (1979) note that comparisons of market organization must occur 
between systems that exist, not theoretical typologies.  
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case of London, many deals below the $10 million threshold have been recorded. RCA works 
in partnership with Property Data (UK), which is the primary source for the London data. 
Information on each transaction is gathered from multiple sources, where possible, including 
subscribing brokerage and investment firms, listing services, press reports and other public 
records. RCA approximate their coverage to be 95% of all real estate transactions over these 
thresholds for the locations studied here. 
 
The dataset spans the period Q1 2001 to Q4 2011 and comprises transactions of both single 
assets and portfolios of assets. The analysis here focuses on deals involving single assets, of 
which there were 10,687 in the two cities over the period concerned.
5
 The number of 
transactions varies over time as market conditions change and this is exhibited in Figure 1. 
Three broad phases can be identified; a period of muted growth and/or low transaction 
activity (2001-2004), a period of strong growth and high transaction volumes (2005-2007) 
and, finally, a strong market correction starting mid- to end-2007 that is accompanied by a 
fall in the number of deals. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The dataset consists of deals for different property types in different districts within each 
metro area. For example, the New York data contains transactions both for Manhattan and the 
outer boroughs, and deals that relate to income-producing apartment blocks as well as offices, 
hotels, retail and industrial properties. London, in comparison, has only a handful of 
apartment deals, reflecting the different structure of the investment market, but transactions in 
                                                 
5
 Note that an ‘asset’ such as an industrial estate or office park may itself comprise more than one 
building. 
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both central and outer London are included. All property types are studied below, but 
development sites were excluded from the analysis. These accounted for 554 transactions, 
just over 5% of the total by number. 
 
Transaction prices were supplied in US dollars and Pounds Sterling in all cases. Each city is 
analysed separately and, where prices are used either for weighting purposes or to distinguish 
high from low value assets, local currency figures are used to prevent distortions from 
currency fluctuations over the period studied. Prices were deflated into real terms using the 
relevant national CPI index and recorded transaction month in each case, with December 
2000 used as the base point.
6
 This was so that the price and price per unit of an asset could be 
compared with that of other assets trading at different times, though analyses using nominal 
prices produce results that are qualitatively similar to those that follow. 
 
Aside from price, date, sector and location, the dataset includes the following fields; address, 
floorspace or number of units, nature of the legal interest, buyer type and national origin, 
seller type and national origin, and the identity of any brokers used by each party. 
Capitalisation rate is available in some cases, but coverage is partial, as is also the case for 
some physical attributes such construction date and the number of floors. Observations were 
removed from the dataset if they contained no information on either the type of buyer or type 
of seller, as these aspects are central to the analyses that follow. This affected 795 cases, 
leaving a final sample of 9,338 transactions or 87.4% of the original number of deals 
available. 
 
                                                 
6
 The US CPI series used was the national index for All Urban Consumers (All Items) available from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The UK CPI series (All Items) was sourced from the Office for 
National Statistics. 
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To explore the forms of brokerage used and the circumstances in which different forms 
occur, a variable was created with the following categories: 1) No broker, 2) For seller only, 
3) For buyer only and 4) Broker for both parties. If broker identity is not recorded, it is 
assumed that no broker was used by that party, although it is possible that the information is 
simply missing.
7
 The categories facilitate econometric analysis of what distinguishes 
transactions where brokerage is observed and cases where each party is represented by a 
broker. First, though, tabular analyses are presented that show the proportion of deals by 
number and/or value that fall into each group. 
 
In addition, variables indicating whether the buyer or seller was domestic or foreign were 
generated under the assumption that non-domestic investors may require the professional and 
information services offered by brokers to a greater extent. However, this was complicated by 
two factors. First, the evolution of property investment vehicles and the internationalization 
of real estate investment mean that, while the registered office of an owner may be easy to 
identify, the location of the effective or beneficial ownership may be very different and 
difficult to observe, as well as spread across multiple parties.
8
 Second, the use of joint 
ventures means that more than one buyer or seller may be recorded, with both domestic and 
non-domestic parties present. In regard to the first issue, the study simply uses RCA’s 
categorisations with respect to nationality of ownership. For the second issue, the investor 
variables were refined to indicate cases with partial domestic involvement as well as cases 
where nationality was unknown. 
 
                                                 
7
 Unless confidentiality clauses restrict such disclosure, brokers are incentivised to identify 
themselves as RCA publish broker rankings amongst their other outputs. 
8
 See Lizieri and Kutsch (2006) for extended discussion of this issue in the context of London. 
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Table 1 shows aggregate information on the use of brokerage in London and New York City. 
In this period, $457bn was transacted in nominal terms and just over $400bn once prices are 
adjusted for inflation. There are more observations for New York, but, if the apartment sector 
is excluded, the number of transactions for each city is roughly equal. Each transaction has 
been classified into one of the four brokerage categories and, by adding together relevant 
categories, the total extent of seller representation and buyer representation is reported.
9
 The 
table shows a clear difference between the two cities in terms of broker use. Both buyer and 
seller representation are higher in London and the difference is especially notable in the case 
of buyers, being 63% of transactions in the case of London versus only 9% for New York. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The higher level of buyer representation in London means that there are more instances 
where two brokerage firms are involved in the transaction, one on behalf of the buyer and 
another for the seller. However, in a small number of cases (23 out of 1,754 deals), a single 
firm is recorded as having acted for both parties. In New York City, there are fewer instances 
where both parties are represented, but more cases where the same firm acts for both sides.  
Out of 490 transactions where both parties use brokerage, 280 are instances where a single 
firm acts for buyer and seller. As per the earlier discussion, some of these cases may be 
instances of dual agency in the traditional sense, but others may reflect representation of each 
party by different national offices of globalised real estate service providers. 
 
                                                 
9
 For instance, ‘Buyer represented’ contains the sum of values shown in the columns ‘For buyer only’ 
and ‘Broker for both’. 
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Some of the patterns at city level could simply reflect that a different mix of assets is traded 
in each market. For instance, in New York, the apartment sector is much more important as 
an investment option than in London. Therefore, Table 2 splits the sample by sector within 
each city to explore whether differences are a function of property type. The results for New 
York City show that offices are brokered more often than assets in other sectors, but still to a 
lesser extent than assets in London, especially in respect of buyer brokerage. For London, the 
retail, office and industrial sectors exhibit similar levels of brokerage and have been more 
frequently brokered than the remaining property types. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Within each sector, there may be differences in brokerage patterns according to the quality of 
the assets transacted. In this dataset, there are no direct measures of building or tenant quality, 
but the price per unit of floorspace (or per apartment) is used here as a proxy measure.
10
 For 
each city, within each sector, transactions were ranked using the relevant price per unit 
measure and then divided into four quartiles. This was with the exception of the apartment 
sector in London and the hotel sector in both cities where sample sizes were too small. The 
use of brokerage within each quartile was then examined. The results are summarised by 
Figure 2, which suggests that there is no consistent relationship between broker use and asset 
quality. Only in the New York retail and apartment sectors does a pattern emerge, with top 
and upper middle quartile assets (those achieving higher prices per unit) more frequently 
brokered than those in the lower quartiles. No such patterns exist in the London data. 
 
                                                 
10
 There are 278 cases in London and 25 cases in New York where this information is missing and so 
the assets concerned are excluded from this particular analysis. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In both of the cities, the use and form of brokerage appears to have shifted over time. Whilst 
buyers and sellers in London are still far more likely to be represented by a broker than in 
New York, Table 3 indicates a reduction in representation during the period 2005-07 when 
capital growth in the commercial real estate market was strongest. By contrast, in New York, 
there appears to be a longer term shift towards increased use of brokers by buyers that began 
in the stronger market of 2005-07 and continued in the subsequent downturn. As with the 
results in Table 1, this does not appear to solely reflect changes in the mix or quality of assets 
being traded. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Another issue is whether the characteristics of the parties involved affect whether brokerage 
is observed. Certain types of market participant might possess greater market knowledge or 
engage in transactions more frequently than others; this is likely to be so for financial 
institutions and publicly listed real estate companies in comparison with corporations or 
individuals buying or selling as building users. With greater knowledge or experience, it is 
hypothesised that the need to engage a broker is reduced, especially on the buy side where the 
marketing element of brokerage is not required. This dimension is considered in Tables 4 and 
5, which examine the influence of buyer and seller type or domicile on broker use. 
 
Table 4 focuses on the characteristics of buyers. For London, it can be seen that financial 
institutions were the group of buyers most often represented and users were the least 
represented. This seems counter-intuitive given the relative expertise of each group and 
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suggests that institutional context or local culture may be important. In contrast, users and 
joint ventures (with multiple organisations involved on the buy side) were the buyer types 
most likely to be represented in New York. Meanwhile, domicile appears to have little 
influence in London on broker use, but the New York results show that foreign buyers were 
much more likely to be represented by brokers in this period, a result that seems more 
consistent with likely differences in information or market experience. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 then reports how often different types of seller were represented in each market. This 
time, there appear to be few differences across any of the categories in the London case, but 
the New York figures suggest a strong association between the use of brokers and the 
Institution and Equity fund seller groups. Again, domicile seems to be of little importance in 
London, but does appear to be important for New York City, with foreign sellers more often 
represented by brokers than their domestic counterparts. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The tabular analysis highlights distinctive behaviour with respect to brokerage between 
London and New York, with a much greater level of brokerage occurring in the former. It 
also reveals interesting patterns regarding when brokerage occurs within each market, 
especially with regard to the characteristics of the parties engaging in each deal. However, 
this style of analysis does not control for factors beyond the specific aspect being studied in 
each case, so econometric analysis is conducted to test whether some of these patterns remain 
once other factors are controlled for. 
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ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, probit models are presented that allow the effect of different variables on 
broker use to be studied while other factors are held constant. Three sets of models are 
estimated. One set examines the decision by sellers to use brokerage and another set 
examines the decision to use a broker by buyers. A final set of models then explores the 
factors that affect the likelihood of brokers being used by both parties. Transaction data for 
each city is modelled separately with the aim of comparing results and seeing whether similar 
factors influence brokerage decisions in each case, notwithstanding the clear difference 
between the cities in broker use overall. The modelling focuses on core commercial (office, 
retail and industrial) assets in each city, but separate models for the apartments sector in New 
York are presented as well for comparative purposes. 
 
The dependent variable in each probit model is dichotomous in form. For the first set of 
models, it takes a value of 1 if a broker is observed as having acted for the seller in the 
transaction and 0 if no seller broker was observed. A similar dependent variable is then 
defined for the second set of models, but with the focus here on whether or not a broker acted 
for the buyer. In the final set of models, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if brokers 
for both the buying and selling parties were observed, and 0 if only one or neither of those 
parties was represented. However, a dilemma arises in respect of cases where the same 
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brokerage firm acted for both sides. For the results presented here, these are treated as 
instances of buyer and double brokerage in the second and final set of models, respectively.
11
 
 
Dummy variables for the year of transaction and sector to which each asset belongs are then 
used as independent variables, as well as other dummies that attempt to capture the nature of 
the buyer and seller. Institutional buyer and Institutional seller take the value of 1 where the 
buying or selling parties, respectively, include a financial institution or equity fund,
12
 while 
Multiple buyers and Multiple sellers are recorded as 1 if there is more than one party in that 
role, such as where an asset is being traded by a joint venture. Partial interest indicates that a 
majority or minority interest in the asset was traded and identification of an asset as either 
Top quartile or Bottom quartile is based on the quality analysis discussed earlier. 
 
Other indicators denote whether the buyers or the sellers are recorded as being domestic or 
foreign or whether nationality was unknown. Nationality may be important in determining 
broker use in that it could indicate familiarity (or otherwise) with the market concerned and 
the extent of access to local market information. In terms of transactions with multiple buyers 
or sellers, a dilemma arises if one partner is domestic and the other is not. Here, these cases 
are defined as ‘domestic’ on the grounds that the foreign partner will benefit from the local 
expertise of their domestic counterpart, but the number of such cases is relatively small (see 
Table 6) and the results that follow are robust to them being classed as either foreign or 
domestic for the purposes of model estimation. 
 
                                                 
11
 Results from the alternative treatment of excluding them from the buyer brokered and double 
brokered groups are qualitatively similar and available from the authors on request. 
12
 The inclusion of equity funds in a wider definition of institutions follows the practice used by RCA 
and reflects the high degree of institutional management and involvement in such funds. 
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Finally, the log of the transaction price was used to detect any tendency for higher value 
assets to be brokered once other factors were controlled for such as the nature of the parties 
involved. However, findings from the literature suggest that price may be endogenous to the 
brokerage decision, i.e. it may be influenced by whether or not the buyer or seller selects a 
broker to represent them. Therefore, an instrumental variables approach was taken to address 
this, with the price variable being instrumented in the commercial real estate case by a 
variable formed from asset floorspace multiplied by mean price per square foot for the sector 
concerned. In the case of apartments, the instrument used was simply the number of units in 
the apartment block. 
 
Further information on the dummy variables is given in Table 6. This reports the proportions 
of the samples for which a given variable takes the value 1 rather than zero. The sample sizes 
are smaller than those used in the preceding section owing to cases without floorspace or 
number of units being omitted from the estimations. The cyclical pattern in trading noted 
from Figure 1 is again evident from the proportions for year dummies while the relative 
importance of different investor groups in each market is clearer. It can be seen that financial 
institutions and equity funds are involved in a far greater share of transactions in London than 
is the case in New York, while foreign buyers and sellers are much more prevalent; 
proportions for these groups in New York City being very small in both the commercial and 
apartment sector cases. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Estimated coefficients for the probit regressions concerning seller brokerage are shown in 
Table 7. Standard errors that are robust to clustering have been used to determine the 
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significance of coefficients owing to the likely presence of correlation between the error 
terms of some observations. This arises because a reasonable proportion of the assets in the 
sample are traded more than once in the period studied.
13
 If unobserved, asset-specific 
attributes in such cases contribute to the likelihood of broker use, then these will affect 
multiple observations in the dataset. Therefore, robust standard errors are used as a 
precaution. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results in Table 7 suggest that, from the available information, patterns in seller 
brokerage are easier to explain in New York than in London. Few of the coefficients in the 
London model are significant and those which are do not seem to correspond with arguments 
concerning either asset complexity or information asymmetry. For New York, offices (the 
base group) were more likely to have had brokerage than other types of commercial real 
estate and there is a positive coefficient for price in both the commercial and apartment sector 
models, indicating that brokerage is more likely for assets commanding higher prices. For 
apartments, the Top quartile coefficient is significant and positive and, for Bottom quartile, it 
is significant and negative, but a similar pattern is not observed for the commercial sector. It 
is also interesting that the coefficient for Partial interest is negative for both London and 
New York, but there are very few such cases and it could reflect instances where trading 
occurred with other parties holding fractional interests in the same property, perhaps 
eliminating the need for brokers, though this cannot be confirmed from the available data. 
 
                                                 
13
 2,733 (29%) of the 9,338 single asset transactions relate to assets that trade more than once during 
the period. There are 1,253 such assets compared to 6,605 cases that trade only once between 2001 
and 2011. 
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Coefficients for investor variables indicate that institutional investors were significantly more 
likely than other types of seller in New York City to use brokers, holding other factors 
constant. The discrete effect of the seller being an institution on the probability of observing a 
seller broker is 7% in the commercial case and 18% in the apartment case. The corresponding 
coefficient in the London model is not significant. Meanwhile, it was expected that Multiple 
sellers would increase the likelihood of brokerage since the involvement of more parties 
arguably complicates the transaction and increases the need for professional advice. Yet 
results for both cities do not indicate a significant difference from the single seller case. 
Foreign domicile has no significant effect either, but this may make sense if these investors 
already have market knowledge as a result of their current ownership and so make brokerage 
decisions on similar criteria to their domestic counterparts. As a caveat, though, it should be 
noted that the unknown group is significant in some instances and the number of cases where 
domicile of either the buyer or seller is unknown is fairly sizeable.
14
  
 
The coefficients from the buyer brokerage regressions are shown in Table 8. Here, the New 
York City regressions only use transactions from 2005 onwards. This is because, prior to this 
date, there are almost no observations of buyer brokerage in the New York data. A similar 
picture to that of Table 7 is evident. For London, few coefficients are strongly significant, 
but, in contrast, most of the asset and investor variables are significant in the New York 
commercial sectors model. In the latter case, offices were more likely to have had buyer 
brokerage than other property types while, in London, this was the case for retail rather than 
office assets. Buyers were less likely to use brokers for Bottom quartile assets in both cities 
and the coefficients on Partial interest echo those found in the seller broker regressions. The 
impact of price, though, is less consistent. 
                                                 
14
 See earlier discussions and the notes for Tables 4 and 5. 
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INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the investor variables, the coefficients indicate quite different patterns between the two 
cities. In London, institutional buyers were more likely to use brokers than any other type of 
buyer, the discrete effect of their involvement being to increase the probability of buyer 
brokerage by 10%. In New York, though, institutional buyers were less likely to use brokers 
to represent them in commercial property purchases, their involvement reducing the 
probability of buyer brokerage by 7%. Furthermore, unlike London, Multiple buyers have a 
positive effect on buyer brokerage while foreign buyers in New York were more likely than 
domestic buyers to use a buyer broker (the caveat about the unknown cases remains). The 
New York findings seem consistent with ideas about transaction complexity and the relative 
knowledge and experience of different buyer types operating within that market. 
 
Results for the final set of models that examine double brokerage are presented in Table 9. 
Once again, in the case of New York City, only transactions from 2005 onwards are used. For 
the London data, double brokerage is as difficult to explain with the available variables as 
either seller or buyer brokerage alone. None of the asset variables are significant at the 5% 
level and few of the investor variables work well. The exception to this is when institutional 
investors are involved in a deal; they are significantly more likely to be involved in double 
brokered transactions than non-institutional counterparts. However, the reverse is true for 
sales of commercial real estate in New York City. Institutional investors here, both as buyers 
and sellers, are less likely to be involved in transactions where both parties are represented. 
The results suggests that such investors, who typically are amongst the most professional and 
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well informed market participants, perceive these different modes of transacting as offering 
particular advantages within the institutional environment that exists in each place. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The transfer of commercial real estate assets occurs over an extended period typically lasting 
weeks or months (see Scofield, 2013) and often involves some form of brokerage. The 
function of the broker/agent is to provide knowledge of the asset and the counterparty; 
knowledge that is crucial to the transaction. This function underpins asset liquidity and so the 
broker can be seen as both a determinant and measurable cost of liquidity. Yet studies of 
commercial real estate investment commonly investigate liquidity without an explicit focus 
on brokerage. While some research has helped define and develop the role of brokers/agents 
within commercial real estate markets (e.g. McAllister et al., 2008), this is the first study, to 
our knowledge, that shows significant variations in broker use and its associated transaction 
costs across international real estate investment markets, and to explicitly equate these with 
variable liquidity costs. 
 
The paper highlights important differences in the use and form of brokerage between the real 
estate markets of London and New York City. Overall, buyer representation is much higher 
in London, occurring in 63% of transactions as compared to only 9% of cases in New York. 
Transactions in London are more likely to be brokered and, when brokerage occurs, it is more 
likely to involve two brokers; one acting for the buyer and one for the seller. These 
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differences are not simply a function of the mix of assets and investors in each location, as 
distinctions remain when comparisons are made between individual sectors or investor types. 
The findings are significant because a brokered transaction will present higher transaction 
costs as compared to non-brokered transaction, while transactions involving two distinct 
brokers represent the highest transaction costs overall. 
 
In the case of London, regression analysis indicates the dominance of investor over asset 
attributes for explaining whether brokers are used and whether both parties are represented. 
In New York City, asset attributes play a greater role in predicting brokerage, but investor 
characteristics remain important, with, for example, both institutional sellers and foreign 
buyers being positively related to broker use. However, institutional investors in New York 
are less associated with double brokerage than non-institutional investors. This is in contrast 
to London, where institutional investors are more associated with double brokerage. Variable 
brokerage costs indicate important, persistent differences in the organization of real estate 
investment firms between markets in response to different institutional arrangements. The 
regression results illustrate such differences, but do not explain why broker use and costs 
vary between the two markets concerned. 
 
New institutional economics postulates that what appears as market inefficiency (investors 
incurring higher transaction costs for reasons not related to asset qualities) is a reaction to 
market norms and the costs of enforcing rules and maintaining and transferring property 
rights. Institutional arrangements (Davis and North, 1971) arguably reflect the most efficient 
system of wealth maximization whilst “inefficient governance will be detected and undone” 
(Friedman, 1966). Thus, the institutional form that is observed should be that which mitigates 
the most risk at the least cost (Williamson 1991). For instance, the system of exchange in 
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which both seller and buyer retain separate broker representation creates an environment well 
suited to the enforcement of norms and rules in an otherwise opaque market. On the other 
hand, if the market institutions current in London and New York City are not shaped solely 
by asset attributes then, as Allen (2012) notes, some aspects of the institutional environment, 
such as the culture of the market, must be driving the different institutional arrangements 
identified herein. 
 
The greater propensity for double brokerage in London may reflect transactional efficiencies 
from this approach that are not observable in the data available to this study. For example, 
future studies could provide valuable insights into the liquidity effects of different forms of 
brokerage. Nonetheless, a double brokered transaction provides an environment conducive to 
information capture and control by the brokers involved. This is a consequence of their 
privileged access to knowledge of the asset and the preferences of both investment principals. 
It creates a network structure defined by three distinct exchange relationships (tri-dyad form), 
a system through which neither party – buyer or seller – is privy to as much information 
about the deal (the asset and counterparty), as the intermediaries (brokers) that stand between 
them (Burt, 1992). So, while providing a mechanism to reduce ‘opportunism’ during the 
exchange (Williamson, 1979), a system of double brokerage paradoxically embeds 
strategically important market knowledge in the hands of intermediaries, away from seller 
and buyer. In turn, this makes adjustment away from such a system and the reduction of 
transaction costs more difficult. 
 
This study has important implications for existing and future real estate research. Holding 
periods within commercial real estate portfolios are affected by transaction costs and these, in 
turn, affect trading volumes, risk and asset pricing (Collett et al., 2003). This study offers sui 
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generis insight into the dynamic nature of transaction costs across ostensibly similar 
investment markets. Unlike previous work, it provides evidence of market specific 
transaction costs and concludes that variable costs are driven by subtle differences in market 
institutions (Allen, 2012). Future research that applies transaction costs to any manner of real 
estate inquiries must adjust the costs of the transaction to individual market realities.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Patterns in brokerage – metro level 
 No broker For seller 
only 
For buyer 
only 
Broker for 
both 
Total Seller 
represented 
Buyer 
represented 
Number of transactions      
  London 460 782 389 1,754 3,385 2,536 2,143 
  New York 3,398 2,011 54 490 5,953 2,501 544 
Percentage by number      
  London 14 23 11 52 100 75 63 
  New York 57 34 1 8 100 42 9 
Value ($ bn)
1
      
  London 34.4 48.5 22.7 117.6 223.2 166.1 140.3 
  New York 55.6 101.9 4.0 15.7 177.2 117.6 19.7 
Percentage by value
2
      
  London 15 22 10 53 100 75 63 
  New York 31 57 2 9 100 66 11 
1
 $ in December 2000 terms. 
2
 Based on deflated local currency values. 
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Table 2: Patterns in brokerage by sector 
 No broker For seller 
only 
For buyer 
only 
Broker for 
both 
Total Seller 
represented 
Buyer 
represented 
% by number – London 
     
  Apartment 35 27 14 24 100 51 37 
  Hotel 44 34 6 17 100 50 22 
  Industrial 14 24 14 48 100 73 62 
  Office 12 23 11 53 100 76 64 
  Retail 11 19 13 57 100 77 70 
% by number – New York      
  Apartment 59 32 1 8 100 40 9 
  Hotel 65 29 3 3 100 32 6 
  Industrial 73 21 1 6 100 27 6 
  Office 39 49 1 11 100 60 12 
  Retail 62 30 1 7 100 37 8 
% by value – London 
     
  Apartment 53 27 5 15 100 42 21 
  Hotel 42 31 8 19 100 50 27 
  Industrial 16 21 13 51 100 71 64 
  Office 12 23 10 56 100 79 66 
  Retail 23 14 13 50 100 65 63 
% by value – New York      
  Apartment 42 46 2 9 100 56 12 
  Hotel 49 39 4 8 100 47 12 
  Industrial 70 22 1 7 100 30 8 
  Office 23 66 2 9 100 75 11 
  Retail 50 39 6 5 100 44 11 
Sample sizes for London: Apartments = 51, Hotels = 109, Industrial = 250, Office = 2,444, Retail = 531. 
For New York: Apartments = 2,711, Hotels = 147, Industrial = 743, Office = 1,310, Retail = 1,042. 
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Table 3: Patterns in brokerage over time 
 No broker For seller 
only 
For buyer 
only 
Broker for 
both 
Total Seller 
represented 
Buyer 
represented 
% by number – London 
     
  2001-04 7 21 10 62 100 83 72 
  2005-07 20 24 13 43 100 67 56 
  2008-11 13 25 11 51 100 76 62 
% by number – New York      
  2001-04 52 46 1 2 100 47 2 
  2005-07 63 31 1 6 100 37 6 
  2008-11 51 34 2 14 100 48 16 
% by value – London 
     
  2001-04 11 21 10 58 100 79 68 
  2005-07 18 23 12 48 100 71 60 
  2008-11 15 22 8 55 100 77 63 
% by value – New York      
  2001-04 28 70 0 2 100 72 3 
  2005-07 32 58 2 7 100 66 9 
  2008-11 33 48 4 15 100 63 19 
Sample sizes for London: 2001-04 = 1,125, 2005-07 = 1,196, 2008-11 = 1,064. For New York: 2001-04 = 759, 
2005-07 = 3,104, 2008-11 = 2,090. 
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Table 4: Form of brokerage by type and domicile of buyer 
 No broker For seller 
only 
For buyer 
only 
Broker for 
both 
Total Buyer 
represented 
% by number – London 
   
  Equity fund 12 22 14 52 100 66 
  Institution 10 16 13 60 100 73 
  Private 15 26 11 48 100 58 
  Public 23 17 13 46 100 59 
  User/Other 12 36 9 43 100 52 
  Joint venture 17 17 8 58 100 66 
% by number – New York    
  Equity fund 59 35 2 5 100 6 
  Institution 39 52 1 8 100 9 
  Private 59 32 1 8 100 9 
  Public 52 43 2 3 100 5 
  User/Other 62 27 1 10 100 11 
  Joint venture 29 57 2 12 100 14 
% by number – London 
     
  Domestic 14 20 13 52 100 65 
  Part foreign 13 19 7 61 100 68 
  Foreign 12 21 11 56 100 67 
  Unknown 14 38 7 41 100 49 
% by number – New York      
  Domestic 59 32 1 8 100 8 
  Part foreign 12 60 7 21 100 29 
  Foreign 27 55 2 16 100 18 
  Unknown 36 47 2 16 100 18 
Samples for London: Equity fund = 250, Institution = 1,087, Private = 943, Public = 281, User/Other = 
576, Joint venture = 248. Domestic = 1,785, Part foreign = 115, Foreign = 949, Unknown domicile = 536. 
Samples for New York: Equity fund = 191, Institution = 156, Private = 4,202, Public = 155, User/Other = 
844, Joint venture = 405. Domestic = 5,482, Part foreign = 42, Foreign = 129, Unknown domicile = 300. 
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Table 5: Form of brokerage by type and domicile of seller 
 No broker For seller 
only 
For buyer 
only 
Broker for 
both 
Total Seller 
represented 
% by number – London 
   
  Equity fund 19 24 11 46 100 70 
  Institution 9 21 12 58 100 79 
  Private 15 25 14 46 100 72 
  Public 19 23 9 49 100 72 
  User/Other 14 29 8 49 100 78 
  Joint venture 16 20 8 56 100 76 
% by number – New York    
  Equity fund 40 52 0 8 100 60 
  Institution 33 59 0 8 100 67 
  Private 60 30 1 8 100 39 
  Public 43 51 1 5 100 56 
  User/Other 58 33 1 8 100 41 
  Joint venture 32 56 2 9 100 65 
% by number – London 
     
  Domestic 13 23 12 51 100 75 
  Part foreign 14 22 6 58 100 80 
  Foreign 15 23 11 51 100 74 
  Unknown 15 23 7 55 100 77 
% by number – New York      
  Domestic 59 32 1 8 100 40 
  Part foreign 26 61 4 9 100 70 
  Foreign 36 53 0 11 100 64 
  Unknown 51 41 0 8 100 48 
Samples for London: Equity fund = 218, Institution = 1,213, Private = 1,005, Public = 419, User/Other = 
274, Joint venture = 256. Domestic = 2,282, Part foreign = 109, Foreign = 812, Unknown domicile = 182. 
Samples for New York: Equity fund = 119, Institution = 157, Private = 4,404, Public = 81, User/Other = 
841, Joint venture = 351. Domestic = 5,151, Part foreign = 46, Foreign = 118, Unknown domicile = 638. 
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Table 6: Percentage of sample accounted for by particular characteristics 
 London New York 
commercial 
New York 
apartments 
Seller broker 76 44 40 
Buyer broker 66 9 9 
Broker for both parties 55 8 8 
Industrial sector 7 24 - 
Office sector 78 42 - 
Retail sector 15 34 - 
Top quartile for sector 25 25 25 
Bottom quartile for sector 25 25 25 
Partial interest 2 4 0 
Institutional buyer 48 12 5 
Institutional seller 50 11 3 
Multiple buyers 9 9 4 
Multiple sellers 10 8 3 
Domestic buyer 53 89 95 
Part foreign buyer
1
 4 1 0 
Foreign buyer 29 3 1 
Nationality of buyer unknown 14 7 4 
Domestic seller 66 83 91 
Part foreign seller
1
 4 1 0 
Foreign seller 24 3 0 
Nationality of seller unknown 6 12 9 
Year 2001 9 3 1 
Year 2002 8 2 1 
Year 2003 7 3 2 
Year 2004 10 7 6 
Year 2005 11 15 19 
Year 2006 12 18 19 
Year 2007 12 17 16 
Year 2008 7 11 10 
Year 2009 7 5 6 
Year 2010 9 8 8 
Year 2011 8 11 11 
No of observations 2,948 3,073 2,710 
1
 Cases where one of two buyers / sellers is domestic and the other is not. 
 
  
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed 
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Table 7: Probit regressions – incidence of seller brokerage 
 London NY commercial NY apartments 
Constant -0.53  -4.27 *** -2.68 *** 
Ln Price 0.06 ** 0.29 *** 0.17 *** 
Sector       
  Industrial -0.13  -0.47 *** -  
  Retail -0.04  -0.25 *** -  
Top quartile 0.09  -0.19 *** 0.14 ** 
Bottom quartile -0.06  -0.06  -0.19 *** 
Partial interest -0.46 ** -1.09 *** -  
Institutional seller 0.07  0.21 ** 0.50 *** 
Multiple sellers 0.12  0.18  -0.01  
Seller domicile       
  Unknown 0.28 ** 0.34 *** 0.07  
  Foreign -0.01  0.14  0.29  
Year       
  2001 0.38 *** -0.42 *** -0.59 *** 
  2002 0.63 *** -0.34 * -0.20  
  2003 0.42 *** -0.44 *** -0.30  
  2004 0.33 *** -0.38 *** -0.37 *** 
  2005 0.32 *** -0.48 *** -0.68 *** 
  2006 -0.39 *** -0.44 *** -0.31 *** 
  2007 -0.19 * -0.20 ** -0.10  
  2008 0.40 *** -0.29 *** 0.04  
  2009 0.36 *** -0.16  -0.27 ** 
  2010 0.00  0.04  0.08  
No of observations 2,948  3,073  2,710  
Wald χ2 159.44  398.10  202.91  
Probability > χ2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Log likelihood -2321.5  -3071.2  -2631.0  
 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The dependent variable equals 1 
where a broker for the seller is observed and 0 otherwise. Omitted categories for dummy independent variables 
are office, seller not an institution, single seller, domestic seller, full ownership and year is 2011. The price 
variable has been instrumented as per discussion in the main text. 
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Table 8: Probit regressions – incidence of buyer brokerage 
 London NY commercial NY apartments 
Constant 1.37 *** -1.57 *** -2.53 *** 
Ln Price -0.06 ** 0.05  0.11 * 
Sector       
  Industrial -0.08  -0.36 *** -  
  Retail 0.17 ** -0.31 *** -  
Top quartile -0.06  -0.17 ** 0.10  
Bottom quartile -0.12 * -0.18 ** -0.20 * 
Partial interest -0.35 * -0.43 ** -  
Institutional buyer 0.30 *** -0.41 *** -0.14  
Multiple buyers 0.02  0.32 ** 0.32 * 
Buyer domicile       
  Unknown -0.32 *** 0.64 *** 0.21  
  Foreign 0.09  0.47 *** 0.11  
Year       
  2001 0.28 ** -  -  
  2002 0.29 ** -  -  
  2003 0.29 ** -  -  
  2004 0.30 *** -  -  
  2005 0.27 ** -0.56 *** -1.00 *** 
  2006 -0.52 *** -0.54 *** -0.89 *** 
  2007 -0.22 ** -0.37 *** -0.67 *** 
  2008 -0.04  -0.50 *** -0.38 *** 
  2009 0.09  -0.30 * -0.70 *** 
  2010 -0.08  0.14  0.36 *** 
No of observations 2,948  2,601  2,440  
Wald χ2 214.93  147.26  190.73  
Probability > χ2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Log likelihood -2554.2  -1838.2  -1466.1  
 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The dependent variable equals 1 
where a broker for the buyer is observed and 0 otherwise. Omitted categories for dummy independent variables 
are office, buyer not an institution, single buyer, domestic buyer, full ownership and year is 2011. The price 
variable has been instrumented as per discussion in the main text. 
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Table 9: Probit regressions – incidence of broker representation for both parties 
 London NY commercial NY apartments 
Constant -0.08  -2.12 *** -1.83 ** 
Ln Price 0.00  0.09 ** 0.05  
Sector       
  Industrial -0.12  -0.36 *** -  
  Retail 0.11 * -0.29 *** -  
Top quartile -0.04  -0.15 * 0.16  
Bottom quartile -0.10 * -0.18 * -0.18 * 
Partial interest -0.31  -0.40 * -  
Institutional buyer 0.23 *** -0.38 *** -0.14  
Institutional seller 0.13 *** -0.38 ** 0.06  
Multiple buyers 0.15 * 0.33 ** 0.36 ** 
Multiple sellers 0.07  -0.16  0.01  
Buyer domicile       
  Unknown -0.20 *** 0.59 *** 0.26  
  Foreign 0.08  0.48 *** 0.16  
Seller domicile       
  Unknown 0.24 ** 0.05  0.01  
  Foreign -0.04  0.06  0.09  
Year       
  2001 0.30 *** -  -  
  2002 0.38 *** -  -  
  2003 0.33 *** -  -  
  2004 0.28 ** -  -  
  2005 0.26 ** -0.52 *** -0.94 *** 
  2006 -0.56 *** -0.59 *** -0.85 *** 
  2007 -0.25 ** -0.35 *** -0.60 *** 
  2008 0.09  -0.50 *** -0.31 ** 
  2009 0.10  -0.41 ** -0.62 *** 
  2010 -0.10  0.15  0.41 *** 
No of observations 2,948  2,601  2,440  
Wald χ2 218.38  148.68  178.76  
Probability > χ2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Log likelihood -2680.3  -1761.3  -1426.0  
 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The dependent variable equals 1 
if there is a broker for each party and 0 otherwise. Omitted categories for dummy independent variables are 
office, buyer not an institution, seller not an institution, single buyer, single seller, domestic buyer, domestic 
seller, full ownership and year is 2011. The price variable has been instrumented as per discussion in the main 
text. 
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Figure 1: Number of transactions in each location and wider market conditions 
(a)  London 
 
(b)  New York 
 
Notes: Transaction counts are from data supplied by RCA for this study. The capital growth index in (a) is the 
IPD UK quarterly index and in (b) is the Moody’s/RCA CPPI for US Major Markets. In both cases, these are 
‘All Property’ series. 
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Figure 2: Quality of asset and use of brokerage 
(a) London 
 
(b) New York 
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